Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this view by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for both problems, what is the cost of adapting an existing stable matching after some of the preferences of the agents have changed. While doing so, we also model the constraint that the new stable matching shall be close to the old one. After formalizing these incremental versions, we provide a fairly comprehensive picture of the computational complexity landscape of Incremental Stable Marriage and Incremental Stable Roommates. To this end, we exploit the parameters "degree of change" both in the input (difference between old and new preference profile) and in the output (difference between old and new stable matching). We obtain both hardness and tractability results, among the latter being one of the few fixed-parameter tractability results (exploiting the parameter "distance between old and new stable matching") in the context of computationally hard stable matching problems.
Introduction
Imagine the following scenario. A manager responsible for a group of 2n workers has to form n two-worker teams based on the preferences over potential work partners of each worker. The manager, being interested in a robust solution, a stable matching (indeed, this refers to the Stable Roommates problem) is computed. However, say every month the workers may update their preferences about wanted work partners (the updates may e.g. be based on gained experiences, new information, newly developed personal skills etc.). The team manager then has to find a new stable matching respecting the individually evolved preferences. To this end, however, the team manager may not want to allow too radical changes in the composition of the two-worker teams because this might e.g. overburden administration. Thus, a moderate change is acceptable, but too radical changes in the team compositions should be avoided whenever possible. We address this scenario by introducing and studying "incremental versions" of the two most prominent stable matching problems, namely Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. 1 In stable matching scenarios or, in other words, in matching under preferences [25] , one is given a set of agents, who have preferences over (some of) the other agents, and one wants to match pairs of agents such that the outcome is stable. Informally speaking, stability means that there are no two unmatched agents that would both prefer to be matched with each other instead of with their current partners in the matching. Two classic problems here are the bipartite case with two equal-sized sets of agents (referred to as Stable Marriage) and the general case of an even number of agents (referred to as Stable Roommates). Motivated by the introductory considerations, we next introduce "incremental versions" of both problems; refer to Section 2 for further formal definitions.
Incremental Stable Marriage
Input: Two disjoint sets U and W of n agents each, two preference profiles P 1 and P 2 for U ⊎ W , a stable matching M 1 for profile P 1 , and a non-negative integer k. Question: Does U ⊎ W admit a stable matching M 2 for profile P 2 such that dist(M 1 , M 2 ) = |M 1 ∆M 2 | ≤ k?
Herein, M 1 ∆M 2 denotes the symmetric difference between sets M 1 and M 2 . The incremental setting for Stable Roommates is defined analogously.
Incremental Stable Roommates
Input: A set V of 2n agents, two preference profiles P 1 and P 2 for V , a stable matching M 1 for profile P 1 , and a non-negative integer k. Question: Does V admit a stable matching M 2 for profile P 2 such that dist(M 1 , M 2 ) = |M 1 ∆M 2 | ≤ k?
In both definitions there are two main regulating screws. First, we are given two preference profiles, the old P 1 and the new P 2 , thereby reflecting the change of preferences. Indeed, to reflect only moderate changes ("evolution"), we will subsequently measure the difference between the two profiles (later referred to as "swap distance"), yielding a natural problem-specific parameter (the smaller it is, the less revolutionary the changes are). Second, the number k can be interpreted as a locality parameter-it exposes how close the new matching has to be to the old one. The smaller we choose k, the more conservative we are with respect to change in the outcome (namely between old and new stable matching). Together, we thus have one parameter to regulate the degree of change measured in the input preferences and one parameter to regulate the degree of change measured in the output stable matching solutions. Taking up these two "parameters" we provide a thorough parameterized complexity analysis of these kinds of dynamic stable matching problems. 2 To this end, we also distinguish between preferences with and without ties. Roughly speaking, we provide positive (fixed-parameter) tractability results in the case without ties and several (parameterized) intractability results for the case with ties. Before describing our results in more detail, however, we discuss some of the related work.
Related work
There is previous work on matching-related problems in the context of dynamic graph algorithms where vertices and/or edges arrive or depart iteratively over time. The goal then is to maintain a solution of sufficient quality by performing necessary updates after every single change. For instance, Bhattacharya [3] studied the maintenance of near-popular matchings (a scenario 2 In the large field of dynamic graph algorithms, which significantly differs from our setting, the term "dynamic" refers to more fine-grained scenarios where typically edges and/or vertices may be added or deleted in a stepwise fashion, and one wants to efficiently update a solution after every such single change. In particular, this has also been studied in the (popular and stable) matching context [3, 15, 29] . The main difference to our work is that we study changes between two preference profiles (not so much in the graph structure), and the changes can be at a larger scale. Moreover, we perform parameterized complexity studies which do not play a role in this previous work.
related to stable matchings) based on a greedy improvement strategy, heavily employing maximum vertex degree in their analysis. Ghosal et al. [15] and Nimbhorkar and Rameshwar [29] study dynamic rank-maximal and popular matchings, again within the setting of dynamic graph algorithms and a focus on update times after each single change in the graph.
Genc et al. [12, 13, 14] studied robustness of a matching in Stable Marriage. Herein, the robustness of a given stable matching is measured by the number of modifications needed to find an alternative stable matching if some currently matched agent pairs break up. They define an (x, y)-supermatch as a stable matching that satisfies the following property: If any x agents break up, then it is possible to rematch these x agents so that the new matching is again stable; further, this re-matching has to be done by breaking at most y other pairs. Genc et al. [12, 13] showed that determining whether a given matching is a (1, y)-supermatch is polynomial-time solvable, while deciding whether a (1, 1)-supermatch exists already becomes NP-complete. The main distinguishing features compared to our model are that, using our two regulating screws mentioned above we can model both moderate changes in the preferences (that is, the input) and moderate differences between the old and the new stable matching (that is, the output). Indeed, we perform a parameterized complexity analysis exploiting these parameters while Genc et al. [12, 13, 14] focus on classic complexity results and use heuristics in experimental work. Moreover, we model changing preferences while they address breaking up matched pairs. Finally, our main contributions are in the Stable Roommates case while they exclusively focus on Stable Marriage without ties.
Mai and Vazirani [23, 24] presented another "robust" version of Stable Marriage, incorporating a probabilistic error model. They provide polynomial-time algorithms in this context. Their investigations thus are further away from what we are doing than the work of Genc et al. [12, 13] .
Marx and Schlotter [26, 27] studied local search aspects for the NP-hard Stable Marriage with ties. More specifically, they investigated the parameterized complexity of a local search variant of Stable Marriage using parameters such as the number of ties, etc. Thus, the main overlap with our work is in terms of searching for local improvements and employing parameterized complexity analysis-the studied computational problems are different from ours as they do not model changes in the input preferences.
Recently, there have been numerous other models and investigations to enrich the basic stable matching model, including the use of only partially ordered preferences [10] , "multilayer" stable matchings with several preference profiles to be obeyed 'in parallel' [2, 8, 28] , or studying robust stability from a quantitative angle [9] .
Finally, let us briefly mention that the motivation for our incremental scenario for stable matching is related to similar scenarios in the context of clustering [6, 22] , coloring [18] , other dynamic versions of parameterized problems [1, 21] , and reoptimization [4, 30] .
Our contributions
Besides introducing a fresh model of stable matching computations, we provide results mostly in terms of parameterized complexity for both Incremental Stable Marriage and Incremental Stable Roommates, where we see the main technical contributions mostly for the latter. In particular, our main algorithmic result is that Incremental Stable Roommates for input instances without ties is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the parameter k (distance between the old and the new matchings). To show this, we heavily use structural results due to Irving [20] and Gusfield [16] and show how to exploit them for designing a fixed-parameter algorithm.
Most of our results are surveyed in Table 1 . Herein, P 1 ⊕ P 2 denotes the swap distance between two preference profiles (see Section 2 for formal definitions). The table indicates Finally, we mention in passing that to achieve our results, throughout the work we also introduce and study some intermediate problems (for instance, Edge-Incremental Independent Set) which may be of independent interest and prove useful in other settings.
Definitions and notations
In this section, we review fundamental concepts used in matchings under preferences.
Preference lists and profiles. Let V = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} be a set of 2n agents. Each agent i ∈ V has a subset V i ⊆ V \ {i} of agents which they find acceptable as partners and has a preference list i on V i (i.e., a transitive and complete binary relation on V i ). Here, x i y means that i weakly prefers x over y (i.e. x is at least as good as y). We use ≻ i to denote the asymmetric part (i.e., x i y and ¬(y i x)) and ∼ i to denote the symmetric part of i (i.e., x i y and y i x). If x ∼ i y, then we also say that x and y are tied in i's preference list and that agent i has ties in their preference list.
For two agents x and y, we call x most acceptable to y if x is a maximal element in the preference list of y. Note that an agent can have more than one most acceptable agent. For two disjoint subsets of agents X ⊆ V and Y ⊆ V , X ∩ Y = ∅, we write X i Y if for each pair of agents x ∈ X and y ∈ Y we have x i y.
A preference profile P for V is a collection ( i ) i∈V of preference lists for each agent i ∈ V . A profile P may have the following properties:
1. It is complete if for each agent i ∈ V it holds that V i ∪ {i} = V ; otherwise it is incomplete.
2. The profile P has ties if there is an agent i ∈ V with ties in their preference list.
To an instance (V, P) we assign an acceptability graph G, which has V as its vertex set and two agents are connected by an edge if each finds the other acceptable. Without loss of generality, G does not contain isolated vertices, meaning that each agent has at least one agent which it finds acceptable. Swaps and differences between two matchings. Given two preference lists and ′ , the swap distance between and ′ is defined as the number of pairs that are "ordered" differently; if and ′ are defined on different sets, then we assume that this distance is infinite. Formally,
For example, if an agent has a preference list on {a, b, c} where all three agents are tied on the first position, that is, a ∼ b ∼ c, then moving to the list c ≻ {a, b} requires two swaps. Let P 1 and P 2 be two preference profiles for the same set V of agents. The swap distance between P 1 and P 2 , denoted as |P 1 ⊕ P 2 |, is defined as the sum of the swap distances between the preference lists of each agent in the two preference profiles. Formally, let j i be the preference list of an agent i ∈ V in the profile P j for j = 1, 2; we have that |P 1 ⊕ P 2 | = i∈V δ( 1 i , 2 i ). Given a set V of agents and a profile P, a matching M is a set of disjoint (i.e., nonintersecting) pairs of agents in V . Given two matchings M 1 and M 2 for the same set V with 2n agents, we define the distance between M 1 and M 2 as the size of the symmetric difference of M 1 and M 2 , formally:
Blocking pairs and stable matchings. Let a preference profile P for a set V of agents, the corresponding acceptability graph G, and a matching M ⊆ E(G) be given. For a pair {x, y} of agents, if {x, y} ∈ M , then we denote the corresponding partner y by M (x); otherwise we call this pair unmatched. We write M (x) = ⊥ if agent x has no partner, i.e. if the agent x is not involved in any pair in M . We use ⊥(M ) to denote the set of unmatched agents in a matching
Given a matching M of P, an unmatched pair {x, y} ∈ E(G) \ M is blocking M if both x and y prefer each other to being unmatched or to their assigned partners, i.e. it holds that
We call a matching M stable 3 if no unmatched pair is blocking M . The Stable Roommates problem is defined as follows:
Stable Roommates (SR) Input: A preference profile P for a set V = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} of 2n agents. Question: Does P admit a stable matching?
Stable Roommates and Stable Marriage. The bipartite variant of Stable Roommates, called Stable Marriage, has as input two n-element disjoint sets U ⊎ W of agents such that each agent u ∈ U from U has a preference list on W u ⊆ W and each agent w ∈ W from W has a preference list on U w ⊆ U . By definition, the underlying acceptability graph of a Stable Marriage instance is bipartite. Accordingly, this instance has complete preferences if this graph is a complete bipartite graph.
The following fundamental result from the literature guarantees that we can deal with incomplete preferences without ties similarly to the case with complete preferences with ties.
Proposition 1 ([17, Theorem 1.4.2, Theorem 4.5.2]). For incomplete preferences without ties, the whole agent set can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets R and S such that every stable matching matches every agent from R and none of the agents from S. For agent sets of size 2n, this partition can be computed in O(n 2 ) time.
Algorithms for Incremental Stable Marriage and Roommates
As a warm-up, we first show that our most restricted problem variant, Incremental Stable Marriage without ties, can be solved in polynomial time. The main idea behind this result is based on the fact that there exists an compact and polynomial-time computable representation of all stable matchings, the so-called partially ordered set of polynomially many rotations [17, Chapter 2] . Herein, a rotation involves a subset of some stable matching "reducing" which results in another stable matching [17, Chapter 2.5.1] . Equipping these rotation with some appropriate weight, we can reduce our problem to finding a closed subset of rotations with maximum weight, which can be solved in polynomial-time using an approach similar to the one discussed in [ Proof. The result from Proposition 2 follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10.
Second we show that our least restricted NP-hard problem variant, Incremental Stable Roommates with ties allowed, can at least be solved in polynomial time when the distance between the matchings M 1 and M 2 is a constant. Proof. Letn = |M 1 |. The algorithm first guesses positive integers k 1 , k 2 with k 1 + k 2 ≤ k which we further treat as follows. We denote by k 1 the number of matching edges leaving M 1 (that is, |M 1 \ M 2 |) and by k 2 the number of new edges (that is, |M 2 \ M 1 |). Now, for each such pair (k 1 , k 2 ) we first guess k 1 edges to delete from M 1 . Notice that there are O(n k 1 ) = O(n k ) possible guesses. LetM 1 be the rest of the matching M 1 (after we delete the just guessed edges). Then we guess k 2 pairs of vertices not matched inM 1 . This completely defines the matching M 2 which can be checked in polynomial-time for stability. Notice that there are
Repeating the above procedure for every pair (k 1 , k 2 ) and applying the obvious bound k ≤ n, we get the overall running time n O(k) as claimed.
The most pressing question following from Proposition 3 is to ask for which cases this result can be improved to a fixed-parameter algorithm for the parameter k, the distance between M 1 and M 2 . Unfortunately, we will show in the next section that this is not possible when ties are involved. For the remainder of this section, however, we show that this is possible when ties are not allowed. Formally, we show the following. The remainder of this section is devoted to show our main result: the algorithm behind Theorem 1, which is inspired by the polynomial-time algorithm for solving maximum weight stable marriage [17, Chapter 2.5.1] (also see Appendix A for more details). The high-level structure of our algorithm is as follows:
1. Using the algorithm of Irving [19] and based on the structural insights of Gusfield [16] that the set of all stable matchings can be compactly and efficiently represented via the so-called partially ordered set (poset) of polynomially many rotations, we compute the poset of rotations for the new preference profile P 2 (see Section 3.1).
Roughly speaking, a rotation (relative to a preference profile) involves a specific cyclic sequence σ of agents where the first acceptable partner in the preference list of each agent x in σ is exactly the second acceptable partner in the preference list of x's predecessor in σ. We remark that for a rotation, removing the first acceptable partner of each agent σ will not alter the existence of a stable matching.
Each high-level step of the algorithm will be described in one of the subsequent subsections. To define our auxiliary problem (which may be of independent interest), for each partially order set (R, ), we say that a given subset C ⊆ R is closed with respect to the relation if for each pair {q, r} ⊆ R of elements it holds that r ∈ C and q r imply q ∈ C.
Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset Input: A partially ordered set (R, ), an undirected graph G = (R, E), a weight function w : R → N, a positive integer ℓ, and a budget b ∈ N. Question: Does there exist a closed subset C ⊆ R of size ℓ which is independent in G such that c∈C w(c) ≤ b?
Here, the conflicts are modeled by the edges so that the graph is also referred to as a conflict graph and seeking for an independent set solution means seeking for a conflict-free set. The structure of the rotation poset implies that in our case the graph G in fact consists of ℓ edges forming a matching of size ℓ. In particular, we will show that we can focus on the special case in which the conflictgraph G consists of ℓ disjoint cliques. For this case we give an algorithm for Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset for parameter b + ∆(G), where ∆(G) is the maximum vertex degree in the graph G. Moreover, it follows from our reduction procedure that b ≤ k (see Section 3.3).
Preprocessing and identification of the rotations
We first recall Irving's polynomial-time algorithm [19] for determining whether an instance of Stable Roommates without ties has a stable matching and fundamental structural properties behind all stable matchings [16] . Irving's algorithm is divided into two phases: Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 involves a sequence of proposals from each agent i to the first agent j on i's list, and each such proposal resulting in the deletion of all successors of i from j's list. Phase 1 does not alter any stable matching since in this phase j is removed from i's preference list (and i is removed from j's preference list) only when (i, j) does not form a pair in any stable matching. The set of lists at the end of the first phase is called Phase 1 of pairs such that on e i 's list h i is the first agent and h i+1 is the second agent in T , for all 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, where i + 1 is taken modulo r.
Note that if (e, h) is a pair in a rotation, then e is ranked last by h with respect to T . Definition 2 (Elimination of an exposed rotation). The elimination of an exposed rotation (e 0 , h 0 ), (e 1 , h 1 ), . . . , ( from table T is the following operation. For every 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, remove every entry below e i in h i+1 's list in T , i.e., move the bottom of h i+1 's list up to e i (from e i+1 ). Then for each agent k who was just removed from h i+1 's list, remove h i+1 from k's list.
In Phase 2, exposed rotations (refer to Example 1, Appendix B) are eliminated from the preference table one by one until some list becomes empty, which means there is no stable matching, or no rotation is exposed in the table, which means the list of every agent contains exactly one agent and we get a stable matching. h 1 ) , . . . , (e r−1 , h r−1 )) is a rotation exposed in some table in D, then the negation of ρ is defined as
If ¬ρ is also exposed in some table in D, then we call ρ and ¬ρ a dual pair of rotations. Any rotation without a dual is called a singleton rotation. 4 Definition 4 (Partially ordered set, and closed and complete subest of rotations). Let R be the set of all rotations which are exposed in some table of some node in D. A subset C ⊆ R of rotations is complete if it contains (i) all singleton rotations and (ii) exactly one rotation from each dual pair of rotation.
A binary relation ⊲ on R is defined as follows. For each pair {ρ 1 , ρ 2 } of rotations, if the elimination of ρ 1 is necessary for ρ 2 to be exposed (i.e., the elimination of ρ 1 precedes the exposition of ρ 2 on every path in D), then we say that ρ 1 precedes ρ 2 , written as ρ 1 ⊲ ρ 2 . The partial order is the reflexive closure of the precedence relation ⊲. A subset C of the rotation R is closed with respect to the partial order (in short, closed) if for each pair {ρ 1 , ρ 2 } of rotations it holds that if ρ 2 ∈ C and ρ 1 ρ 2 , then ρ 1 ∈ C.
Note that the rotation poset on R is an O(n 2 )-sized representation of all stable matchings. It follows from Gusfield [16] that one can compute R in O(n 3 · log(n)) time.
Lemma 1 ([16]
). For a given Stable Roommates instance without ties, there is a one-toone correspondence between the set of stable matchings and complete and closed subsets of the rotation poset (R, ⊲). Finding this poset (R, ) can be done in O(n 3 · log(n)) time, where n denotes the number of agents in the instance.
According to Lemma 1, to solve our problem, it suffices to search for a complete and closed subset of rotations for the second input profile P 2 such that the corresponding stable matching is closest to M 1 .
Proposal sets and rotation weights
In this section, we study the influence of a rotation elimination on the distance between the ultimate resulting matching and the initial matching. In order to do so, we first define proposal sets for preference tables and weights of rotations. Here, the weight of a rotation shall capture how many pairs of the initial matching we can additionally obtain if we eliminate this rotation. Then we study the properties of the thus introduced rotation weights. This is used later to finish the sought reduction and to determine upper bounds on parameter values of the resulting instance.
Imagine that in a preference table, every agent proposes to the first agent in their current preference list. Then, we get a set of ordered pairs, where the agent indicated by the first component of each pair proposes to the agent indicated by the second component in the pair.
Definition 5 (Proposal sets).
For each preference table T , the proposal set for T is defined as
where (i, j) represents a proposal pair i → j (i.e., agent i proposes to agent j).
For each matching M , the proposal set S M for M is defined as
By the definition of proposal sets, for each matching M we have
Hence, we are looking for a matching M 2 which is stable with respect to profile P 2 such that
Since every complete and closed rotation subset contains all singleton rotations and since all singleton rotations can be eliminated from the table before all dual rotations [16] , we can first eliminate all singleton rotations. By Proposition 5, if after eliminating all singleton rotations, some agent obtains an empty preference list, then we can immediately conclude that the given profile does not admit any stable matching. Thus, in the following, we assume that there is no singleton rotation in R.
To measure the benefit of eliminating a rotation, we define the following.
Definition 6 (Gain and lost proposal pairs after a rotation elimination). For each rotation ρ = (e 0 , h 0 ), (e 1 , h 1 ), . . . , (e r−1 , h r−1 ) exposed in some table T , the set of proposal pairs gained (lost) by eliminating rotation ρ is defined as follows.
| be the number of desired proposal pairs gained and lost by the elimination of rotation ρ.
Observe that the two sets S + ρ and S − ρ are independent of the table T and all of the proposal pairs of agents not involved in the rotation ρ remain the same before and after the elimination of ρ.
Since in order to obtain a stable matching, we have to eliminate exactly one rotation from each dual pair of rotations, we now prove that their weights are complementary.
Lemma 2. Let ρ ∈ R be a dual rotation, then w + (ρ) = w − (¬ρ).
Proof. Let ρ := (e 0 , h 0 ), (e 1 , h 1 ), . . . , (e r−1 , h r−1 ), and let S + ρ and S − ρ be the sets of proposal pairs gained and lost by eliminating p, respectively. That is,
By the definition of dual rotations, the dual of ρ is equal to ¬ρ = (h 0 , e r−1 ), (h 1 , e 0 ), . . . , (h r−1 , e r−2 ). Accordingly, we have:
, . . . , (h r−1 , e r−1 )}, and (5)
By (3) and (6), we can infer that for each ordered pair (i, j) of agents it holds that (i, j) ∈ S + ρ if and only if (j, i) ∈ S − ¬ρ . (7) Since M 1 is a matching, it follows that for each unordered pair {i, j} ∈ M 1 of agents we have
Together with (7), we conclude that for each ordered pair (i, j) of agents it holds that (i,
Thus,
Reduction to Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset
In this section we give a reduction from Incremental Stable Roommates to Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset in which the conflict graph is a matching. In order to do so, we show that the distance between the target (i.e., initial) matching M 1 and a matching M C resulting from the elimination of a complete and closed set C of rotations for P 2 (if such sets exist) depends only on ρ∈C w − (ρ).
In the remainder of the section, let S 0 be the proposal set for the Phase 1 table from P 2 and let R 2 be the set of all dual rotations for P 2 ; it is known that R 2 has at most n 2 rotations.
Upper-bounding the sum of weights of a complete and closed subset. Before we continue with the procedure, we compare the sizes of M C and M 1 ; recall that M c is a matching resulting from eliminating a complete and closed set C of rotations for P 2 . By Proposition 4, every agent that has non-empty list after Phase 1 must be matched under M C and these agents are exactly those agents who hold some proposals in S 0 . Consequently, for each agent x that is matched under M 1 but does not hold a proposal under S 0 it holds that {x, M 1 (x)} ∈ M 1 ∆M C . Thus, we define the following reduction rule.
Reduction Rule 1. For each agent x matched under M 1 , if for each agent y it holds that (x, y) / ∈ S 0 , then delete {x, M 1 (x)} from M 1 and decrease k by one.
Lemma 4. Rule 1 is sound and can be implemented in O(n 2 ) time. Moreover, if Rule 1 does not apply, then for each stable matching M of profile P 2 it holds that
Proof. Let x be as defined in the rule, i.e., x is matched under M 1 but does not hold a proposal in S 0 . For ease of notation, let M
Let M be a stable matching for P 2 . By Proposition 4, it follows that x is unmatched under M . Thus,
The soundness of the reduction rule follows.
As for the running time, for 2n agents in P 2 , in O(n 2 ) time we can complete Phase 1 and obtain the proposal set S 0 which has size at most 2n. Then, in O(n) time we can check for each matched agent (under M 1 ) whether it is "unmatched" in S 0 .
As for the second statement, it is immediate that |M 1 | ≤ |M |. Again, by Proposition 4, it holds that |M | = |S 0 |/2. Hence,
Next, we upper-bound the size of the intersection between the target (i.e., initial) matching and the sought matching.
Lemma 5. Let C be a complete and closed subset of rotations in R 2 and let M C be the stable matching associated with C. Then, the following holds.
Proof. To show the first statement, let us first observe the following, which is similar to the case in the marriage setting (see Lemma 8 and Corollary 1).
Claim 1. Let T be a preference table and ρ be a rotation exposed in T , and let T ′ be the preference table obtained from T by eliminating ρ. Then,
Proof. The proof is similar to the one given for Lemma 8. Let ρ := ((e 0 , h 0 ), · · · , (e r−1 , h r−1 )) be a rotation exposed in the table T . In the following, all subscripts i + 1 are taken modulo r. By the definition of T ′ and the definition of proposal sets we have that
Thus, we prove the statement in the claim by showing the following.
The last equation holds because S T ∩ S + ρ = ∅ and S − ρ ⊆ S T and because of Definition 6.
(of Claim 1) ⋄ By applying the above repeatedly, we obtain the following for an (arbitrary) closed subset of rotations.
Claim 2. If C ′ is a closed subset of rotations and T is the preference table obtained by eliminating all rotations from C ′ on the Phase 1 table, then
Now, we are ready to show our first statement. To this end, let C and M C be as defined in the lemma. By Claim 2, it follows that
This completes the proof for the first statement. The second statement follows directly from (1), (2), and the first statement.
As for the last statement, we first observe that for each two distinct rotations σ and σ ′ from R 2 it holds that
To see this, let σ := ((e 0 , h 0 ), . . . , (e r−1 , h r−1 )) which is exposed in some preference table T . Then, by definition, it holds that
. However, by [16, Lemma 5.1, Corollary 5.1], for each i ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}, no other other rotation ρ exists such that (e i , h i+1 ) ∈ S + ρ . Next, we observe that S 0 ∩ S + σ = ∅. To see this, let σ := ((e 0 , h 0 ), . . . , (e r−1 , h r−1 )). Then,
. By the definition of rotations, it follows that e i prefers h i to h i+1 , implying that h i+1 is not the first agent in the preference list of e i right after Phase 1. That is, (e i , h i+1 ) / ∈ S 0 . Thus, we have that
Now, to show the last statement, it suffices to show that |M 1 | ≤ |M C |. This is true by Lemma 4:
Construction 1. Finally, we arrive at the following instance of Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset:
(i) Apply Rule 1 in O(n 2 ) time, and compute in O(n 3 · log n) the rotation poset (R 2 , ) for P 2 (see Lemma 1).
(ii) Let R := R 2 be the set of all dual rotations; note that |R 2 | ≤ n 2 (Lemma 3), (iii) Let G be a graph on R in which two elements of R are adjacent if they form a dual pair of rotations (consequently, G is a union of ℓ = |R|/2 disjoint edges).
(iv) The weight function w is defined by w − .
(v) The budget b on the sum of weights is b :=
Note that b is derived from Lemma 5(ii) such that we are searching for a complete and closed subset C of rotations whose sum of weights is bounded by b. To see this, since|S M | = |S 0 |/2 (Lemma 4), the budget b is in fact equal to
, where M is an arbitrary stable matching for P 2 . Thus, by Lemma 5(ii), by Lemma 5 the budget b is at most k/2. Note also that the sum of the weights w − (ρ) is upper-bounded by n and thus the reduction presented above is a polynomial (many to one) reduction.
Solving Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset when the conflict graph consists of ℓ disjoint cliques. Now, to prove Theorem 1, we only need to show the following; recall that the budget b, as defined in the construction, is at most k/2.
Proof. We present an algorithm for the special case of Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset when the conflict graph G is a union of exactly ℓ cliques (see Algorithm 1).
First we introduce some notation. For every element p ∈ R, let
be the set of all predecessors and the set of all ancestors of p (including p itself). For a set P ⊆ R we define T ↑ P as the union p∈P T ↑ p ; the set T ↓ P is defined analogously. Before we continue with the proof, we observe the following.
Proof. When p ∈ S, since S is closed, we get T In fact it follows from the results of Gusfield [16] that Rule 4 is never used in any Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset instance resulting from the construction we just defined. Proof. Note that we have to take at least one vertex from each clique in G into S since we are about to take ℓ elements in total; thus, Rules 3 and 4 are sound. Clearly, no solution S can contain any set T of weight w(T ) > b, yielding soundness of Rule 2.
Indeed, Rule 2 runs in O(R) time. As for Rules 3 and 4, we need to update T ↑ q , T ↓ q and the corresponding weights for every element q left in the (updated) set of rotations R. This can be done in a straightforward way in O(|R| 2 ) time.
(of Claim 3) ⋄ We apply Rules 2 to 4 exhaustively. Now, we branch on a clique K with 0 < w(T ↑ p ) ≤ b for every p ∈ K since we have to add one element of K into any solution anyway. Note that in this branching we omit those cliques K for which min p∈K w(T ↑ p ) = 0 holds. This procedure yields a search tree of depth at most b with branching factor ∆(G) + 1. Suppose that there is a leaf with nonnegative budget in which there is no clique left for branching. We claim that this is a yes-instance. At this point any clique left in G contains at least one element p with w(T 
we select greedily these elements into the solution S. Observe that this gives a valid solution since all of these sets are of total weight 0 (note that by including p in the solution all of the weights can only decrease). As for the claimed running time, recall that it is possible to update all of the sets T left for branching in O(|R| 2 ) time. Furthermore, Rules 3 and 4 are invoked O(b) times and Rule 2 at most once.
We finally come to our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1 . By Construction 1, in polynomial time, we construct an instance for Weighted Conflict-Free Closed Subset where the budget b is upper-bounded by k/2 and the conflict graph consists of |R 2 |/2 edges (see the reasoning right after Construction 1). By Lemma 6, we can solve this instance and thus our problem in O(2 k · n 4 ) time.
Hard cases of Incremental Stable Roommates
Throughout this section, we are using the following non-standard "incremental" (resp. "decremental") variants of the Independent Set (resp. Clique) problem to show parameterized intractability.
Our first problem asks for an independent set of size h for some graph in the case when an independent set of size h for the graph minus an edge is already known.
Edge-Incremental Independent Set
Input: A graph G, a distinguished edge e * ∈ E(G), a positive integer h, and an independent set S * of size h for G − e * . Question: Does there exist an independent set S of size h in G?
Our second problem asks for a clique with pendant edges of size h for some graph in the case when a clique of size h with pendant edges for the graph with an additional edge is known. A clique with pendant edges for a graph G is a subset V ′ ⊂ V (G) of vertices such that V ′ forms a clique in G, i.e., each two vertices in V ′ are adjacent, and that each vertex in V ′ has at least one neighbor outside V ′ . The size of a clique with pendant edges is defined as the number of vertices in the clique.
Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges
Edge-Incremental Independent Set. We give a reduction from Independent Set parameterized by the size h of the solution to Edge-Incremental Independent Set again with parameter h. Let (Ĝ, h) be an instance of Independent Set. We construct graph G from G = (V, E) as follows: We add a set S * of h new vertices and for each vertex v ∈ V and each vertex s ∈ S * we add edge {v, s}. We finish the construction by picking two distinct vertices s and s ′ from S * and adding to E the edge e * = {s, s ′ }. Clearly, S * is an independent set of size h in G − e * as required.
Observe that for each independent set S in G we either have S ⊆ V or S ⊆ S * , since we have added a complete bipartite graph between V and S. Now, since any independent set S in G with S ⊆ S * contains at most h − 1 vertices, an independent set of size h in G can only contain vertices from the set V , thus it must be an independent set of size h in the graphĜ.
Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges. Without loss of generality, we assume that h > 2 and describe a straight-forward parameterized reduction from Edge-Incremental Independent Set parameterized by the size h of the solution to Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges with parameter h. Given the instance (G, e * , S * , h) of Edge-Incremental Independent Set, we create the graph G ′ by complementing the graph G − e * and adding for each original vertex in v ∈ V (G ′ ) a new vertex that is only connected to v. It is easy to verify that (G ′ , e * , S * , h) is a yes-instance of Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges if and only if (G, e * , S * , h) is a yes-instance of Edge-Incremental Independent Set. (The newly added vertices ensure the existence of the pendant edges and can never be part of a clique of size more than two.)
Incremental Stable Roommates is generally hard even without ties
To show that Incremental Stable Roommates without ties is NP-hard, we identify a relation of our problem to an egalitarian variant of stable matching where the egalitarian cost is minimized. Here, the egalitarian cost of a matching M is defined as the sum of the ranks of the agents with respect to their partners, and the rank of an agent x with respect to its partner M (y) is equal to the number agents that x prefer over y. Feder [11] showed that finding a stable matching with minimum egalitarian cost is NP-hard for Stable Roommates, even for complete preferences without ties (see the work of Chen et al. [7] for fixed-parameter tractability results on this problem).
The original hardness proof by Feder [11] is to reduce from Vertex Cover, which, given an undirected graph G and an integer h ′ ∈ N, asks whether G admits a vertex cover of size h ′ , i.e., a size-h ′ vertex subset of V ′ ⊆ V (G) such that each edge in E(G) is incident to at least one vertex from V ′ . The basic idea behind the reduction is that putting a vertex to the solution set is equivalent to increasing the egalitarian cost by one. This correspondence can also be achieved
Proof Sketch. We present a reduction from the Independent Set problem which is W[1]-hard when parameterized by the solution size. Let G = (V, E) be a graph and h be the desired size of the independent set.
Following essentially the construction of Feder [11] , we create our instance of Incremental Stable Roommates as follows. For each vertex v i ∈ V , we create four agents p i ,p i , q i ,q i . The preferences of these agents in P 2 are identical to the profile constructed by Feder [11] :
The old profile P 1 is defined as follows.
Following the proof of Feder [11] we can conclude that matching all p i with theq i and q i with thep i is a stable matching for P 1 . In order to obtain a stable matching for P 2 , however, one can only keep those p i matched with theq i that correspond to an independent set.
Ties in the preferences make Incremental Stable Marriage hard
We show that Incremental Stable Marriage becomes intractable when ties are allowed even if the two preference profiles P 1 and P 2 are almost identical. The following result is achieved by a parameterized reduction from Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges. Proof. We present a parameterized polynomial-time reduction from the W[1]-hard Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges (see Lemma 7) . Let (G = (V, E), e * , S * , h) be an instance of Edge-Decremental Clique with Pendant Edges, where S * ⊆ V is a clique with pendant edges of size h in G. We assume without loss of generality that |E| > h 2 + h. To identify each clique vertex with its pendant edge, we introduce the following notion. Let C be a clique with pendant edges. By definition, each clique vertex from C has at least one neighbor outside C. Thus, for each clique vertex v ∈ C, let w be an arbitrary but fixed neighbor of v outside C. We use pen C (v) to denote the corresponding pendant edge {v, w}. Further, we denote by pen(C) := {pen(v) | v ∈ C} the set of pendent edges of clique C.
In what follows, agent sets U and W will not have the same cardinality so that some agents need to remain unmatched. Note that for incomplete preferences with ties, using standard padding tricks, we can make U and W have the same carnality and simulate an agent being unmatched by being matched with dummy agents. Since using dummy agents to "garbage collect" the unmatched agents will increase the size of symmetric difference between our initial matching and the sought matching, we need to make sure that the number of unmatched agents is upper-bounded by a function in k.
Agents, preferences, and the symmetric difference bound k. In our Incremental Stable Marriage instance, we will have one agent for each vertex from V and one agent for each edge from E. For simplicity, we use the same symbols for vertices (edges) and the corresponding agents. Further, we introduce three sets of auxiliary agents: X := {x 1 , . . . , x |V |−h }, Y := {y 1 , . . . , y |E|−( h 2 )−h−1 , y * }, and Q := {q 1 , . . . , q t }, where t is an even number which is to be determined later, and two special agents y † and e † .
We partition our agents such that U = V ∪ Y ∪ {e † } ∪ {q 1 , q 3 , . . . , q t−1 } forms one part and W = X ∪ E ∪ {y † } ∪ {q 2 , q 4 , . . . , q t } forms the other part. The preferences of the agents in profile P 1 are set as follows.
The path agents:
For each i ∈ {2, . . . , t − 1} :
Finally, we list the preferences of the four special agents associated with the extra edge e * = {u * , v * }:
The only agent changing its mind in profile P 2 , compared to P 1 , is the agent y † who switches the relative order of the (only) two potential partners in its preference list. The preference list of agent y † in P 2 becomes y * ≻ e † . We set the difference k between the two matchings M 1 and M 2 to k := h 2 + 5h + 4 and set t := 2 · ⌈k/2⌉ + 2, which is strictly larger than k. It remains to define the matching M 1 that is stable for profile P 1 to complete the construction. Before we do this, we sketch the idea of the construction.
Construction idea and the initial matching M 1 . Observe that |W | − |U | = h 2 agents will remain unmatched. As already discussed at the beginning of the proof, we can introduce h 2 dummy agents to "garbage collect" these unmatched agents. However, this will increase our parameter k only by 2 · h 2 . To convey the actual idea of the reduction, however, we omit introducing these dummy agents. Now, the idea of our construction is that the set ⊥(M 1 ) of agents that are not matched by our initial matching M 1 corresponds to the set of edges of the clique S * for G. Analogously, for every stable matching M 2 for P 2 the set ⊥(M 2 ) of agents that are not matched by M 2 will have to correspond to a set of edges of some clique S for G − e * .
This can be formally captured as follows. Figure 1 : Illustration of the stable matching M 1 for P 1 and a desired stable matching M 2 for P 2 (see Definition 7 and Definition 8). Observe that each agent from U is matched in both M 1 and M 2 . The agents from S and from S * \ S changed their partners. The agents from pen(S) and from
2 )) changed their partners.
Definition 7.
We define the initial matching M 1 as follows.
(i) Match agent e † with agent y † .
(ii) Match every clique vertex agent v ∈ S * with its pendant edge agent pen S * (v).
(iii) Match every non-clique vertex agent v ∈ V \ S * to an arbitrary but fixed agent from X.
(iv) Match every agent from Y with an arbitrary but fixed non-pendant and "non-clique" edge agent e ∈ E \ ( S * 2 ∪ pen(S * )). (v) For every odd number i ∈ {1, 3, . . . , t − 1}, match agent q i with agent q i+1 .
This completes the construction which can be computed in polynomial time. The following claim implies that M 1 is stable for P 1 . It will be used later in the correctness proof.
Claim 4. The set of unmatched agents in M 1 is S * 2 . Moreover, M 1 is stable for P 1 . Proof. The first statement follows from the fact that by Definition 7, every agent from U is matched and by Definition 7(iv), exactly those edge agents which correspond to the edges from S * 2 are unmatched under M 1 .
As for the second statement, suppose for the sake of contradiction, that {u, w} is a blocking pair of M 1 with u ∈ U and w ∈ W . Now, observe that each agent from S * ∪(Y \{y * })∪{e † } ⊆ U already obtains its most preferred agent as a partner. Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t/2}, the path agent q 2i−1 only prefers to an agent z to its assigned partner with z ∈ X ∪ {q 2i ′ | 1 ≤ i ′ ≤ t/2}, but agent z already obtains its most preferred agent as a partner (either some vertex agent or some path agent). It follows that u ∈ V \ S * or u = y * . Since y * only prefers y † to its partner but y † already obtains its most preferred agent as a partner, it follows that u ∈ V \ S * , i.e., u is some non-clique vertex agent. This implies that M 1 (v) ∈ X. By the preferences of the agents from V and since M 1 (u) ∈ X, it follows that w is some edge agent such that u ∈ w. Since u is not a clique vertex from S * , it follows that w ⊆ S * 2 , implying that w ∈ E \ S *
. If
w ∈ E \ ( S * 2 ∪ pen(S * )), i.e., it is also not a pendant edge of some clique vertex from S * , then it obtains a partner from Y and will not form with u a blocking pair because u is a vertex agent. Thus, w must be a pendant edge agent from pen(S * ). In this case, w is matched to another incident vertex agent which is different from u. However, since w considers both its incident vertex agents as tied, it cannot form with u a blocking pair, a contradiction.
(of Claim 4) ⋄ Correctness of the Construction. We show that there is a stable matching M 2 for profile P 2 with |M 1 ∆M 2 | ≤ k if and only if there is a clique C ′ with pendant edges of size h for G − e * . For the "only if" direction, let S be a clique with pendant edges pen S of size h for G − e * . For ease of notation let E(S) = S 2 ∪ pen(S) and E(S * ) = S * 2 ∪ pen(S * ). Definition 8. We construct the target matching M 2 as follows.
(i) Match e † with e * and y * with y † .
(ii) Match each clique vertex v ∈ S with its pendant edge agent pen S (v).
(iii) Match each non-clique vertex agent v ∈ V \ (S ∪ S * ) with the partner M 1 (v) (note that this partner is from X).
(iv) Match each remaining non-clique vertex agent v ∈ S * \ S with an arbitrary but fixed notyet-matched agent from X.
(vi) Match each remaining not-yet-matched agent y ∈ Y \ {y * } with an arbitrary but fixed not-yet-matched agent from E \ E(S).
(vii) For every odd number i ∈ {1, 3, . . . , t − 1}, match agent q i with agent q i+1 .
We claim the following for matching M 2 .
Claim 5. The set of unmatched agents in M 2 is S 2 . Moreover, M 2 is stable for P 2 .
Proof. Since S is a clique with pendant edges for G − e * , we can infer that e * / ∈ S 2 ∪ pen(S). Thus, M 2 is indeed a matching. Moreover, by the definition of M 2 (see Definition 8(ii), (v), (vi)) and similarly to the proof for Claim 4, we can conclude that exactly those edge agents which correspond to some edge from S 2 are unmatched under M 2 . As for the stability proof, observe that y † 's most preferred agent in P 2 is agent y * . Using a proof similar to the one for Claim 4, we can conclude that M 2 is stable for P 2 . (of Claim 5) ⋄ Now, we upper-bound the size |M 1 ∆M 2 |.
Proof. To prove this, note that we only need to count the number of agents from U who change their partners because both M 1 and M 2 match all agents from U and unmatch exactly (1) The clique vertex agents from S, (2) the non-clique vertex agents from S * \ S, (3) the agents y from Y \ {y * } with M 2 (y) ∈ E \ E(S) \ E \ E(S * ) , (4) the agents y * , and e † .
Before we continue with the bound, let us recall a property in set theory.
For each three sets A, B, C it holds that
Substituting A = E \ E(S), B = E, and C = E(S * ), we conclude the following for the set of agents described in (3) .
Summarizing, by the definition of E(S * ), the number of agents from U that changed their partners is at most |S| + |S * | + |
(of Claim 6) ⋄
For the "if" direction, let M 2 be an arbitrary stable matching for P 2 with |M 1 ∆M 2 | ≤ k. Our correctness proof mainly relies on the following claim.
Claim 7. Let Z ⊆ V be the set of vertex agents that are not matched to X in M 2 and let F = E ∩ ⊥(M 2 ) be the set of unmatched edge agents. The following holds.
(ii) |Z| = h.
(iv) Every agent from Z is matched to an edge agent from E \ Z 2 . Proof. For the first statement, observe that by the preferences of the agents from {y * , e † , y † , e * } in P 2 and by the stability of M 2 for P 2 it must hold that M 2 (e † ) = e * and M 2 (y † ) = y * . Thus, e * is matched, implying that e * / ∈ F . For the second statement, note that M 2 must match every agent from X to some agent from V as otherwise there would be an agent x ∈ X with M 2 (x) = q 1 . Every stable matching, however, that contains {x, q 1 } must also match q 2i with q 2i+1 for every number i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t/2 − 1}. The symmetric difference between M 1 and M 2 is at least 2 · (t/2 − 1 + 1) = t > k-a contradiction. Since |X| = |V | − h it follows that exactly h agents from V remain that are not matched to X. By the definition of Z, we immediately have |Z| = h.
To show the third statement, first, we show that
Towards a contradiction, suppose that there is an edge e ∈ F \ Z 2 , i.e., there exists an unmatched edge agent e ∈ F for which at least one of its endpoint is matched to X. Let v ∈ e be such an incident vertex of e with M 2 (v) ∈ X. Note that by the first statement, we have that e = e * since e is unmatched under M 2 . Now, we claim that M 2 is not stable since {v, e} is a blocking pair. Indeed, edge agent e is not matched and prefers to be matched with v and v finds e better than its current partner (from X). Thus, M 2 is not stable-a contradiction.
Second, we show that |F | ≥ h 2 . To see this, observe that by the preferences of the agents from E \ {e * }, each edge agent from E \ {e * } is either unmatched or matched to a vertex agent from V or matched to an agent from Y \ {y * }. Now, recall by the definition of Z that each agent from V \ Z is matched to some agent from X. Thus, each edge agent from E \ {e * } is either unmatched or matched to an agent from Z ∪ Y ∪ {y * }. By the definition of F and since M 2 (e * ) = e † , it follows that
The second to last equation holds because |Z| = h (see the second statement). Together with (11), we infer that |F | = h 2 and thus F = Z 2 . Finally, to show the last statement, consider an arbitrary agent z ∈ Z. By the definition of Z, it follows that z is either unmatched or matched to some agent from E \ F . By the definition of F and by the third statement, there exists an unmatched edge agent e ∈ F which is incident to z. By the stability of M 2 it must hold that z is matched to some edge agent from E \ F , i.e., from E \ Z 2 .
(of Claim 7) ⋄ We construct our clique S with pendant edges pen S of size h for G − e * by applying Claim 7 as follows. The clique is set to S := Z and for each vertex v ∈ S we set its pendant edge pen S (v) to M 2 (v). Note that by Claim 7(i) it holds that e * / ∈ F . Together with and Claim 7(iii) we infer that |{u * , v * } ∩ Z| ≤ 1 and, hence, Z is indeed a clique in G − e * . By Claim 7(iv), the defined pendant edges are all from G − e * .
In the following, we show that with respect to the number of common pairs between the target stable matching and the initial stable matching the problem is parameterized intractable, even if the two input profiles differ by only two swaps. The corresponding parameterized reduction is from Independent Set. Proof. We show this by reducing from the W[1]-hard Independent Set problem, parameterized by the solution size. The parameterized Independent Set problem has, as input, an undirected graph G and an integer h ∈ N-the parameter-and asks whether G admits an independent set of size h, i.e. an h-vertex subset of V ′ ⊆ V (G) of pairwise nonadjacent vertices. Let I = (G, h) be an instance of Independent Set. Further, let V (G) = {v 1 , . . . , v n } and E(G) = {e 0 , . . . , e m−1 } denote the set of vertices and the set of edges in G respectively; note that we start the index of the edges with zero to simplify our reasoning later. We construct an instance (P 1 , P 2 , M 1 ) of Incremental Stable Marriage with ties, where the two profiles P 1 and P 2 are preference profiles for two disjoint sets of agents, U ∪ W ∪ E ∪ F ∪ A ∪ B and X ∪ Y ∪ H ∪ C ∪ D, and the matching M 1 is stable for P 1 such that P 1 and P 2 will differ from each other by only two swaps. We will be searching for stable matching M 2 for P 2 with |M 1 ∩ M 2 | ≥ 2h.
The agent sets. For each vertex v i ∈ V (G), we introduce four agents u i , w i , x i , y i , and add them to U , W , X, Y , respectively.
For each edge e ℓ ∈ E(G) with two endpoints v i and v j , do the following. Introduce four agents e ℓ , f ℓ , h The preference lists of the agents from U , W , X, and Y . The preference lists of these agents are the same in both P 1 and P 2 , and are constructed in such a way that an arbitrary stable matching must match these agents among themselves. Here, [⋆] means that the elements in ⋆ are ranked in an arbitrary but fixed order, while (⋆) means that the elements in ⋆ are tied.
The preference lists of the agents from E, F , and H. The preference lists of these agents are the same in both P 1 and P 2 .
∀e ℓ ∈ E[G] with e ℓ = {v i , v j } and i < j, e ℓ : (h
The preference lists of the auxiliary agents from A, B, C, and D. Except for the agents c 0 and d 0 , the preference lists of these agents are the same in both P 1 and P 2 . We first describe the preference lists of all the auxiliary agents in P 1 , and then only describe the preference lists of c 0 and d 0 in P 2 as the other will remain the same. The operations "ℓ + 1" and "ℓ − 1" are taken modulo m.
In P 2 , the preference lists of agents c 0 and d 0 will be changed so that the acceptable agents are not tied any more:
It is straight-forward to verify that P 1 and P 2 differ by only two swaps.
The initial stable matching
One can verify that this matching is indeed a stable matching of P 1 .
As already mentioned, we set the minimum number of common pairs between M 1 and the target matching M 2 (which shall be stable in P 2 ) to be 2h. This completes the construction.
The following figure depicts a portion of acceptability graph of profile P 1 , where the labels on the edges denote the ranks of the agents. The edges marked with gray colors are part of matching M 1 . Before we show that this is parameterized reduction, we observe the following.
Claim 8. Every stable matching M of P 2 satisfies the following.
For each vertex
2. For each edge e ℓ ∈ E(G), agents c ℓ and d ℓ must be assigned some partners under M .
3. For each edge e ℓ ∈ E(G) with e ℓ = {v i , v j }, we have that
Proof. For the first statement, suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists some vertex v i such that {M (u i ), M (w i )} = {x i , y i }. By the preference lists of x i and y i , it follows that x i or y i is not assigned a partner by M . If agent x i was not assigned a partner, then it will form with w i a blocking pair of M as x i is the only agent which w i prefers most. Analogously, if agent y i was not assigned a partner, then it will form with u i a blocking pair of M .
For the second statement, observe that a ℓ−1 ranks c ℓ at the first place. If agent c ℓ−1 would have been unmatched under M , then it would form with a ℓ−1 a blocking pair. Analogously, we can obtain that d ℓ−1 must also be assigned a partner.
For the third statement, observe that in P 2 , agents c 0 and a m−1 form a fixed pair, meaning that they prefer each other more than any other agents. Thus, agents c 0 and a m−1 must be matched with each other in any stable matching of P Now, we are ready to show the correctness of the construction, i.e. I admits an independent set of size h if and only if P 2 admits a stable matching M 2 with |M 1 ∩ M 2 | ≥ 2h. For the "only if" direction, assume that V ′ is an independent set of G with h vertices. We construct matching M 2 as follows.
2. For each edge e ℓ ∈ E(G), let v i and v j denote the endpoints of e ℓ with i < j. If v j ∈ V ′ is from the independent set, implying that
It is straight-forward to verify that |M 1 ∩M 2 | = 2h as they share at the pairs that correspond to the vertices in the independent set. Now, we focus on the stability of M 2 . Towards a contradiction, suppose that M 2 is not stable in P 2 , and let p be a blocking pair of M 2 . This pair p must involve some agent from
First of all, one can verify that no agent w i from W would be involved in a blocking pair because x i is the only agent with which w i could form a blocking pair, but x i will already obtain its most preferred agent y i . Further, no agent from E ∪ F ∪ A ∪ B would be involved in a blocking pair as they already received one their most preferred agents. Thus, we obtain that p involves some agent from U , say u z . We know that M 2 (u z ) = y z as otherwise we have that M 2 (u z ) = x z which is u z 's most preferred agent-a contradiction to u z being in blocking pair p. By our definition of M 2 , it follows that v z ∈ V ′ is from the independent set. Hence, the other agent in blocking pair p must be some agent h uz ℓ with v z ∈ e ℓ such that h For the other direction, assume that M 2 is a stable matching of P 2 , sharing with M 1 by at least 2h pairs. By the third statement in Claim 8, it follows that M 2 can only share with
(a) The graph of an Edge-Incremental Independent Set instance (G, e * = {v 3 , v 4 }, h = 2, S * = {v 3 , v 4 }). The instance is a yes-instance: The graph G admits an independent set {v 1 , v 4 } of size two, marked in light green.
The acceptability graph of the corresponding Incremental Stable Roommates instance (for both P 1 and P 2 ). Profile P 2 admits a stable matching, marked by the thick dotted green lines. by the pairs that involve some agents from U ∪ W ∪ X ∪ Y . Now we construct a vertex subset according to these pairs. Let
Clearly, using the first statement in Claim 8, we have that
. Now, to show that V ′ is indeed an independent set, suppose, towards a contradiction, that V ′ has two adjacent vertices, denoted as v i and v j . Let e ℓ be the incident edge of v i and v j . By the fourth statement of Claim 8 we have that M 2 (h
Finally, we show that even a single swap in the preference list of one single agent makes the Incremental Stable Roommates problem W[1]-hard with respect to k when ties are allowed. To show this result, we give a reduction from Edge-Incremental Independent Set. The construction idea is inspired by a reduction from Vertex Cover to Stable Roommates with structured preferences [5] , which, however, is relying on incomplete preferences and not showing parameterized intractability. Proof. Let (G = (V, E), e * ∈ E, h, S * ⊆ V ) be an Edge-Incremental Independent Set instance with r := |V | vertices. We assume w.l.o.g. that h < r, S * = {v r−h+1 , . . . , v r }. Moreover, we assume that e * ⊆ S * (as otherwise the input instance is a trivial yes-instance) with e * = {v r−1 , v r }. We construct an Incremental Stable Roommates instance (P 1 , P 2 , M 1 ) with agent set U and |P 1 ⊕ P 2 | = 1. We will show that G has an independent of size at least h if and only if P 2 admits a stable matching M 2 with |M 1 ⊕ M 2 | ≤ 4h.
Before we describe the construction, we prove the following claim which is heavily used in our preference profile construction to force two agents to be matched together.
Claim 9. Let P be a profile for an agent set U , and let x, y, and z be three distinct agents with the following preference lists, agent x : V ≻ y ≻ z ≻ . . . , agent y : z ≻ x ≻ . . . , agent z : x ≻ y ≻ . . . , where V ⊆ U \ {x, y, z} is a non-empty subset of agents, The symbol ". . ." at the preference list of each agent a denotes an arbitrary but fixed order of all remaining agents, other than a and not explicitly stated before ". . .": Then, every stable matching M for P must fulfill that (i) M (x) ∈ V and (ii) {y, z} ∈ M .
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction to (i) that P admits a stable matching M with M (x) / ∈ V . There are three cases: (1) M (x) = y, implying the blocking pair {y, z}, (2) M (x) = z, implying the blocking pair {x, y}, and (3) M (x) / ∈ {y, z} ∪ V , implying the blocking pair {x, z}. Thus, x must be matched with some agent from V . For (ii), statement (i) implies that neither y nor z is matched with x. Now, if {y, z} / ∈ M , then {y, z} forms a blocking pair.
(of Claim 9) ⋄ Main idea and the constructed agents. To explain the main idea of the reduction, we first describe the agent set U and the corresponding non-complete acceptability graph of P as illustrated through an example in Figure 2 . At the end of the proof, we show that we can adjust the reduction so that the acceptability graph becomes complete. For each vertex v i ∈ V , we introduce a vertex agent v i (for the sake of simplicity, we use the same symbol for the vertex and the corresponding agent). Additionally, there is a set of cover agents C := {c 1 , . . . , c r−h } as well as three sets of selector agents X := {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x h }, Y := {y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y h }, and Z := {z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z h }. The agent set U is defined as
For the acceptability graph, we have that every vertex agent v i accepts every cover agent from C, every selector agent from X, and every vertex agent v j that corresponds to a neighbor of v i in the input graph G. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}, the collector agents x i , y i , and z i pairwisely accept each other.
Using Claim 9 we construct the preference profile P 2 of the agents such that in every stable matching only the cover agents from C and the selector agents from X can be matched to the vertex agents and the vertex agents matched to the selector agents from X correspond to an independent set (of size |X| = h). These properties are given by the subsequent Claim 11.
Agent preferences in P 1 and P 2 . First, we describe the preferences profiles P 2 that realize the idea and the acceptability graph as described above.
With a single swap in the preference list of agent v r , we obtain the profile P 1 :
Herein, for each agent subset D, we denote by [D] the lexicographic order of the agents by their names (resp. by their indices), called the canonical order. The symbol ". . ." at the preference list of each agent a denotes an arbitrary but fixed order of all remaining agents, other than a and not explicitly stated before ". . .":
Stable matching M 1 for P 1 . The initial matching M 1 is defined as follows:
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} set M (v r−i+1 ) := x i ;
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − h} set M (v i ) = c i ;
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} set M (y i ) = z i .
This completes the construction and can clearly be performed in polynomial time.
Correctness of the construction. First of all, we claim that in the constructed Incremental Stable Roommates instance M 1 is indeed a stable matching for P 1 .
Claim 10. The matching M 1 is a stable matching for the profile P 1 .
Proof of Claim 10. First, observe that, by definition of M 1 , no agent from C or X can be involved in a blocking pair, since they all are matched to one of their (tied) favorite partners. Second, since the agents from X are not available also the agents from Y and from Z cannot be involved in blocking pairs. Finally, a blocking pair that consist of two agents from V (the last possibility for a blocking pair to emerge) would mean that we have two agents v r−i+1 i and v r−j+1
(1 ≤ i = j ≤ h) that are both matched to some agent from X. Furthermore, in order to be a blocking pair both agents must be adjacent in G because only agents corresponding to neighbors in G are preferred to agents from X. Since the vertices v r−h+1 , . . . , v r are an independent set in G − e * for e * = {v r−1 , v r }, only {v r−1 , v r } could be a blocking pair. However, {v r−1 , v r } is also not blocking M 1 because (due to the swap of x 1 and v r−1 in the preferences of v r between P 2 and P 1 ) agent v r prefers its partner M 1 (v r ) = x 1 over v r−1 .
(of Claim 10) ⋄ Second, we claim the following:
Claim 11. Every stable matching M ′ 2 for P 2 satisfies the following two properties:
1. every vertex agent v i is matched to either a cover agent from C or a selector agent from X, that is, M (v i ) ∈ C ∪ X for every v ∈ V , and 2. no two vertex agents that are both matched to the selector agents are adjacent in G.
Proof of Claim 11. Let M ′ 2 be a stable matching for P. For the first statement, observe Claim 9 immediately implies that for every selector agent x i ∈ X, it holds that M (x i ) ∈ V . Thus, there are exactly r − h vertex agents left that are not matched to agents from X. Suppose towards a contradiction that some cover agent c j is not matched to any vertex agent, implying that at least one vertex agent v i is left with M (v i ) / ∈ X ∪ C. This, however, implies that {c j , v i } is a blocking pair for M ′ 2 -a contradiction. For the second statement, suppose towards a contradiction that there are two vertex agents v i , v j with {M (v i ), M (v j )} ⊆ X as well as {v i , v j } ∈ E. The preference lists of v i and v j immediately imply that agents v i and v j form a blocking pair-a contradiction.
(of Claim 11) ⋄ Now, we show that G has an independent set of size at least h if and only if P 2 admits a stable matching M 2 with |M 1 ⊕ M 2 | ≤ 4h.
The "if" part follows immediately from Claim 11 because it directly implies that the vertices corresponding to the h vertex agents matched to selector agents from X are pairwisely nonadjacent in the graph G.
For the "only if" part, assume that S ⊆ V be an independent set of size h for G.
and such that M 2 is stable for P 2 . First, we match all selector agents and the vertex agents corresponding to the independent set S:
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} set M 2 (y i ) := z i (= M 1 (y i ));
• for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h} set M 2 (v s i ) := x i .
So far, at most 2h agents have different partners in M 1 and M 2 . At least r − 2h vertices are neither in the independent set S for G nor in the independent set S * = {v r−h+1 , . . . , v r } for G − e * . We keep the partners for the corresponding vertex agents unchanged:
Finally, some number q ≤ h of vertex agents, namely those corresponding to vertices from S * \S, are so far unmatched in M 2 . Symmetrically, also q ≤ h cover agents, namely those cover agents that where matched to vertex agents from S * \ S in M 1 , are also so far unmatched in M 2 . We pair these agents arbitrarily such that each vertex agent is matched to a cover agent to finalize the definition of M 2 so far. Doing this, at most 2q ≤ 2h agents will get different partners in M 2 when compared with M 1 . Hence, |M 1 ∆M 2 | ≤ 4h.
It remains to show that M 2 is stable. This can be done analogously to the proof of Claim 10. First, observe that, by the definition of M 2 , no agent from C or X can be involved in a blocking pair since they all are matched to one of their (tied) favorite partners. Second, since agents from X are not available, the agents from Y and from Z cannot be involved in blocking pairs. Finally, a blocking pair that consist of two agents from V (the last possibility for a blocking pair to emerge) would mean that we have two agents v i and v j that are both matched to some agent from X. Furthermore, in order to be a blocking pair both agents must be adjacent in G because only agents corresponding to neighbors in G are preferred to agents from X. This is a contradiction to our definition of M 2 , where the h agents from X have been matched to h vertex agents corresponding to the independent set S.
Unbounded k. Note that in this proof, we never used an explicit bound on the parameter k for any proof argument to work. In particular, if there is any stable matching for P 2 , then there is one with distance |M 1 ⊕ M 2 | ≤ 4h (this follows from Claim 11 and from the idea given in the "only if" part). In particular, the problem remains NP-hard if we set k = 2n, that is, k ′ = 2n − k = 0. In other words, the problem remains hard even if the distance between the matchings M 1 and M 2 is unbounded.
Conclusion
Motivated by dynamically changing preferences and the necessity to adapt the corresponding solutions, we introduced an "incremental view" on the computation of stable matchings. We believe that there are plenty of opportunities for future research, including, for instance, to study the role of parameters measuring the number of ties-in many hardness reductions this parameter was unbounded. We also left open whether Incremental Stable Roommates without ties is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by the swap distance between the two input preference profiles. Naturally, there are also future directions concerning more conceptual work, e.g. also studying further stability concepts in the context of our incremental model.
A Incremental Stable Marriage without ties
In this section, we show that Incremental Stable Marriage without ties can be solved in polynomial time, using an idea similar to the one for finding the so-called maximum weight stable matching, a stable matching whose corresponding closed subset of rotations have maximum weight [17, Chapter 3.6.2] ; the concept revolving around the rotations will be defined shortly. Gusfield and Irving [17] presented a network flow approach to find such a maximum-weight stable matching in O(n 2 · w) time, where n and w denote the number of agents and the sum of weights of rotations, respectively. We will show that for our problem the sum of the weights of rotations is bounded by n, which is the size of the intersection between our sought stable matching and the target stable matching.
In the remainder of the section, we present necessary notions and the definition of the weights of the rotations and refer to Chapter 3.6.1 by Gusfield and Irving for further details.
A.1 Preliminaries
The approach will heavily utilize the structural properties revolving around stable matchings and rotations of a Stable Marriage instance without ties.
As already observed in the literature, for each Stable Marriage instance P with two disjoint sets U and W of agents, when operating on the agent set U , the Gale-Shapely algorithm always returns a U -optimal stable matching M . The matching M is U -optimal stable matching if it is stable and there is no other stable matching M ′ such that an agent from U would prefer its partner from M to the partner from M ′ . Starting from the U -optimal stable matching, we can successively eliminate the so-called rotations to obtain further stable matchings.
Definition 9 (Successor agent, rotations, and rotation elimination). Let P be a Stable Marriage instance with two disjoint sets of agents, U and W , and with (possibly) incomplete preferences. Given a stable matching M for P , for each agent u ∈ U , we define its successor succ M (u) as the first (after M (u)) agent w on the preference list of u such that w is matched under M and prefers u to its partner M (w).
A sequence ρ = ((u 0 , w 0 ), (u 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (u r−1 , w r−1 )) of pairs is called a rotation if there exists a stable matching M for P such that for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} we have (u i , w i ) ∈ U × W , M (u i ) = w i , and succ M (u i ) = w i+1 (index i + 1 taken modulo r). We say that rotation ρ is exposed in M .
We use the notation M/ρ to refer to the matching resulting from M by replacing each pair {u i , w i } with {u i , w i+1 }. Definition 10 (Predecessors of rotations, the rotation poset, and the rotation digraph). Let π and ρ be two rotations for a Stable Marriage instance P . We say that π is a predecessor of ρ, written as π ⊲ P ρ, if no stable matching in which ρ is exposed can be obtained from the U -optimal stable matching by a sequence of eliminations of rotations without eliminating π first. The reflexive closure of the relation ⊲ P , denoted as P , defines a partial order on the set of all rotations and is called the rotation poset for P . We abbreviate the name of a subset of the poset that is closed under predecessors as a closed subset.
An alternative representation of the rotation poset (P ) is through an acyclic directed graph, called rotation digraph of P and written as G(P ), whose vertex set is the set of rotations of P , and there is a direct arc from rotation π to rotation ρ if and only if π precedes ρ and there is no other rotation σ such that π ⊲ P σ ⊲ P ρ.
Finally, let us describe a central result from the literature that relates rotations and stable matchings.
Proposition 7 ([17, Theorem 2.5.7, Lemma 3.3.2]). Let R denote the set of all rotations of a preference profile P , and let G(P ) denote the rotation digraph of P . The following holds.
1. A matching M is a stable matching of P if and only if there is a closed subset of rotations R ′ ⊆ R with respect to the precedence relation ⊲ P such that M can be generated by taking the U -optimal stable matching and by eliminating the rotations in R ′ in an order consistent with ⊲ P .
2. The rotation set R and the rotation digraph G(P ) can be computed in O(n 2 ) time.
A.2 From Incremental Stable Marriage to Finding Maximum-Weight Closed Subset of Rotations
Given an instance I = (P 1 , P 2 , M 1 , k) of Incremental Stable Marriage, let M 0 be the U -optimal stable matching of P 2 , let R 2 denote the set of rotations for P 2 , and let G 2 be the rotation digraph for P 2 . Towards finding a stable matching which shall be as close to the input matching M 1 as possible, we assign a weight to each rotation from R 2 which shall indicate the benefit of eliminating this rotation. That is, we count the number of pairs in M 1 the elimination of ρ introduces minus the number of pairs in M 1 we loose when eliminating ρ. By the above definition, we can derive the following.
Lemma 8. If ρ ∈ R 2 is a rotation exposed in a stable matching M for P 2 , then
Proof. Let ρ = ((x 0 , y 0 ), · · · , (x r−1 , y r−1 )) be a rotation exposed in the stable matching M . In the following, all subscripts i + 1 are taken modulo r. By the definition of M/ρ we have that M/ρ = {{x, y} ∈ M | (x, y) / ∈ ρ} ⊎ {{x i , y i+1 } | 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}. Thus, we prove the statement by showing the following; note that no {x i , y i } belongs to M/ρ, 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1.
|{{x, y} ∈ M 1 | (x, y) = (x i , y i+1 ) for some 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}| =|{{x, y} ∈ M 1 ∩ M }| − |{{x, y} ∈ M 1 ∩ M | (x, y) ∈ ρ}|+ |{{x, y} ∈ M 1 | (x, y) = (x i , y i+1 ) for some 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1}| =|M 1 ∩ M | + w(ρ).
Note that the second to last equation holds because (x, y) ∈ ρ implies that {x, y} ∈ M .
By applying Lemma 8 repeatedly, we obtain the following. Since a stable matching M 2 for P 2 with minimum symmetric difference dist(M 1 , M 2 ) has the maximum intersection M 1 ∩ M 2 , we obtain the following. Proof. By the definition of symmetric difference, we derive the following.
Since for preferences without ties, all stable matchings match the same set of agents (Proposition 1), we have that |M 0 | = |M 2 |. Together with Corollary 1, (12) is equivalent to
Our statement follows immediately.
By the above, our problem reduces to finding a maximum-weight closed subset of rotations. In the following, we show that the sum of the weights of the rotations is at most n and finding such a subset of rotations can thus be done efficiently. Proof. Slightly abusing the intersection notation, for each rotation ρ = ((x 0 , y 0 ), · · · , (x r−1 , y r−1 )) ∈ R 2 we define ρ ∩ M 1 := {(x i , y i+1 ) | {x i , y i+1 ∈ M 1 }} (i + 1 is taken modulo r).
Next, observe that by one of the statement in [17, Lemma 3.2.1] implies that for each pair (x, y) there exists at most one rotation ρ such that (x, y) ∈ ρ ∩ M 1 . Moreover, by definition, we have that w(ρ) ≤ |ρ ∩ M 1 |. Summarizing, we have that Gusfield and Irving [17, Theorem 3.6.2] showed that finding a maximum-weight closed subset of rotations can be reduced to finding a minimum s-t cut in a specific flow network which features the precedence relation of the rotations, where the numbers of vertices and arcs are in O(n 2 ) and the minimum cost of an s-t cut is bounded by the sum of the weights of the rotations. The latter problem can be solved in O(|E| · w) time (by using Ford-Fulkerson's algorithm), where |E| denotes the number of arcs in the network and w is the cost of the minimum s-t cut. Since |E| ∈ O(n 2 ) and since w ≤ ρ∈R 2 w(ρ), we can find a maximum-weight closed subset of rotations in O(n 2 · |M 1 |) = O(n 3 ) time.
B Additional Material for Section 3
Example 1 ( [16] ). To get better acquainted with Irving's algorithm and, more importantly, the notion of rotations, their exposition, and their elimination, we give an example illustrating this. Consider the following profile with eight agents-the complete profile is to the left and the Phase 1 table is to the right. For the sake of readability, the symbol ≻ between the agents in the preference lists of each agent are omitted.
In the Phase 1 table, there are two rotations: ρ 1 = ((1, 2), (2, 6) , (3, 5) ) and ρ 2 = ((4, 1), (5, 7)). Now, we eliminate the rotation ρ 1 , that is, we remove
• the top choices for agents 1, 2, 3 and
• 8, 1 from the preference list of agent 2, since 2 finds 3 better than these two and is becoming the top choice for 3.
After the elimination of ρ 1 , we obtain the following table. 
